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REJECTING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
IN PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION 
Howard M. Wasserman*
INTRODUCTION 
 
Constitutional cause litigation often produces far-reaching procedural 
innovations, as courts figure out how to incorporate substantively unique 
cases into existing judicial structures.1
One example is Perry v. Brown, a challenge to the constitutionality of 
California’s Proposition 8, a voter-enacted ban on same sex marriage.
  In the litigation over marriage 
equality and the validity of laws prohibiting or declining to recognize same-
sex marriages, one procedural complication and innovation has involved 
defendant standing—who can defend litigation challenging the 
constitutionality of state and federal rules, both at the trial level and on 
appeal from an adverse judgment. 
2  
Plaintiffs named the governor, attorney general, and several other executive 
branch officers as defendants.  When all the named defendants declined to 
defend Prop. 8’s constitutionality, the district court allowed the initiative’s 
proponents to intervene to defend the law.3
The problem arose when the district court invalidated the marriage 
limitation and permanently enjoined enforcement of the ban; the named 
officer-defendants declined to appeal the judgment, raising the question 
whether the initiative’s supporters, although proper intervenors in the trial 
court, had standing to initiate litigation at the appellate level.  The Ninth 
Circuit ordered briefing on the issue, then certified to the California 
Supreme Court the question of whether the initiative’s proponents enjoyed 
particular special interests under state law that they could protect in 
litigation, including on appeal.
 
4
The California Supreme Court concluded that the initiative’s proponents 
had authority under state constitutional and statutory law to litigate on 
behalf of the government and to assert California’s interests in the validity 
 
 
*  Professor of Law, FIU College of Law.  Thanks to Thomas Baker and Matthew Hall for 
their comments. 
 1. Cf. Burt Neuborne, The Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010 SUP. 
CT. REV. 59, 60 (arguing that concern for racial injustice and state institutional failure shaped 
the Warren Court’s decisions in a range of areas). 
 2. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 3. Id. at 1068. 
 4. Id. at 1070 (citing Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry V), 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 
2011)). 
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of state law where elected officials declined to do so.5  The Ninth Circuit 
accepted the state court’s answer and permitted the sponsors to appeal the 
judgment.6
A second example involves challenges to the constitutionality of section 
3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which, for purposes of all 
federal law, defines marriage as consisting only of a “legal union between 
one man and one woman as husband and wife” and spouse as “a person of 
the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”
 
7  In 2011, the Department of 
Justice decided that non-recognition of same-sex marriage warranted 
heightened scrutiny, which, in DOJ’s view, DOMA-influenced federal law 
could not survive.  Attorney General Eric Holder notified Speaker of the 
House John Boehner of this new litigation posture, and of DOJ’s 
unwillingness to defend DOMA in several district court cases in which 
standard of scrutiny was an open question.8  Boehner then convened the 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG), which retained outside counsel 
and intervened in several district court actions to provide a vigorous 
constitutional defense.9
The question that has been litigated and discussed is whether these 
substitute defendants should have standing to intervene in the litigation, at 
trial and on appeal, in the face of the refusal of the relevant named 
executive officers to do so.  Matthew Hall’s thoughtful and thorough article 
in the Fordham Law Review mines these issues, creating the first direct 
analytical framework for deciding whether someone has standing to be a 
defendant in a case (including pursuing the case on appeal from an adverse 
judgment), independent of the standing of plaintiffs.
 
10  Descriptively, Hall 
is correct in labeling this a matter of standing because that is how courts 
treat it, and his framework and analysis is beneficial to courts when viewing 
this as a justiciability issue.  Hall is also correct that the constitutional 
authority of someone to defend should be considered independent of the 
constitutional right of the plaintiff to sue.  He establishes a faithful Article 
III analysis that also ensures that laws can be vigorously defended.11
 
 5. Perry v. Brown (Perry VII), 265 P.3d 1002, 1025 (Cal. 2011). 
  This 
is an important goal, given the public benefit of removing hurdles to 
 6. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1070–75. 
 7. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).  More precisely, these lawsuits challenge all provisions of the 
United States Code affected by DOMA’s limited definition of marriage and spouse. See Neal 
Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 
509 n.4 (2012). 
 8. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. 
House of Reps. (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/
February/11-ag-223.html. 
 9. Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1564–66 (2012); see, e.g., Revelis v. Napolitano, No. 11 C 1991, 
2012 WL 28765, at *8–9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2012); Windsor v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 2d 
320, 323–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 10. See generally Hall, supra note 9. 
 11. Id. at 1575–84. 
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litigation and ensuring vigorous defense of the constitutionality of federal 
and state law.12
This response Essay argues that this dispute ought not really be about 
standing, in the sense of Article III’s requirement of a case or controversy 
between interested adverse parties with a personal stake in the outcome of 
the case.  We speak about it as standing only because of the questionable 
doctrine of sovereign immunity (of both the state and federal governments), 
under which the government entity cannot be sued eo nomine (by name) in 
federal court.  Sovereign immunity forces plaintiffs to sue executive branch 
officers responsible for enforcing a given law.  This, in turn, presents 
defendant standing questions when, as in the marriage equality cases, 
someone seeks to defend the law at trial and on appeal when the named 
responsible officer refuses to defend or defends on less than favorable 
grounds. 
 
The argument here is that we can and should reject sovereign immunity 
of the federal or state governments, removing a doctrine that is inconsistent 
with the constitutional and political structure of the United States.13
I.  SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL OFFICER LITIGATION 
  
Instead, plaintiffs should be able to sue the government (or relevant 
government department or agency) by name when seeking to enjoin the 
enforcement of unconstitutional laws, thus bringing the case caption in line 
with reality.  By eliminating the need to identify individual defendants, we 
remove the issue from the rubric of Article III and standing.  The 
government is the named defendant with a stake in the outcome of litigation 
and that provides the adverseness that Article III demands. 
The conversation about standing (at trial and on appeal) and intervention 
in the marriage equality cases, which prompted Hall’s article, results from 
the prevailing regime of sovereign immunity, under which a sovereign 
cannot be sued in its own name absent consent.14
Sovereign immunity originates in monarchies, where the root power of 
government has been placed in the hands of one, divinely decreed person.  
It has been criticized as theoretically inconsistent with republican 
government where, at the theoretical level, the people are sovereign and the 
source of lawful authority, government acts on the people’s behalf, and the 
expectation is that government should be accountable to the people for its 
conduct.
 
15
 
 12. See Joan Steinman, Shining a Light in a Dim Corner:  Standing to Appeal and the 
Right to Defend a Judgment in the Federal Courts, 38 GA. L. REV. 813, 832 (2004) 
(describing the values served by allowing persons to litigate and appeal). 
  Steve Gey labeled this “ultimate sovereignty” and argued that 
 13. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1201 
(2001) (“Sovereign immunity is an anachronistic relic and the entire doctrine should be 
eliminated from American law.”). 
 14. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against 
Governments and Officers:  Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1963). 
 15. See U.S. CONST. amend X; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 783–85 (1999) (Souter, J., 
dissenting); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER:  THE SUPREME COURT 
SIDES WITH THE STATES 152 (2002); Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1201–02; Lauren K. 
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“no government is truly ‘sovereign’ in the ultimate sense because all 
governments must obtain their authority from those who consent to the 
exercise of that authority over them”—in other words, the people.16  
Sovereignty “cannot be found in America in the form classically 
imagined,”17
Immunity is a necessary product of notions of royal divinity; the dignity 
of the prince and the affront to royal dignity that comes with hailing the 
sovereign into court without his consent.  It “represent[s] a view of the 
sovereign as divinely commissioned, and of the citizen as lacking power 
and agency,” which means that it “fit[s] poorly with both American self-
understanding and the founding generation’s belief in democratic 
accountability.”
 where authority is divided among three branches and not 
derived from, or vested in, any one branch. 
18
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has imported sovereign immunity 
to the state and federal governments as entities, protecting them from all 
private lawsuits.  This has been explicit at the state level, initially driven by 
the text of the Eleventh Amendment,
  Moreover, it is incoherent to ascribe dignity to a legal 
entity or for it to suffer an affront to that dignity. 
19 but broadened to include immunity 
from suits by any private individual, regardless of source of law, court, and 
plaintiff’s citizenship.20  Chief Justice Marshall identified sovereign 
immunity for the federal government as “universally received opinion.”21  
This immunity is complete.  Although the Court unfortunately speaks 
loosely of sovereign immunity as prohibiting actions against states for 
damages,22
State sovereign immunity is even more questionable as applied to 
lawsuits under federal law or in federal court.  The essence of sovereignty is 
the power to make the legal rules that bind actors, and the rationale for 
sovereign immunity is that it is logically impossible for an individual to 
have and enforce a right against the authority that makes the legal rule on 
which the right depends.
 the doctrinal reality is that neither a state government nor 
federal government can ever be the named defendant (absent waiver or 
abrogation, neither of which is present in constitutional litigation), 
regardless of the relief sought. 
23  Gey labeled this “immediate sovereignty”—the 
power to “issue commands and have them obeyed.”24
 
Robel, Sovereignty and Democracy:  The States’ Obligations to Their Citizens Under 
Federal Statutory Law, 78 IND. L.J. 543, 550–51, 554 (2003). 
  States are not 
immediately sovereign as to the Federal Constitution or federal law because 
 16. Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1626–27 
(2002). 
 17. NOONAN, supra note 15, at 152. 
 18. Robel, supra note 15, at 553; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1201–02. 
 19. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713; see U.S. CONST. amend. XI (eliminating federal jurisdiction 
over suits “commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State”). 
 20. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713–14. 
 21. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411–12 (1821). 
 22. E.g., Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1333 (2012). 
 23. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); Robel, supra note 15, at 550. 
 24. Gey, supra note 16, at 1631. 
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they do not issue those legal commands; they derive from the federal 
government (or from the people acting through the federal government).  
Whatever the merits of the sovereign immunity of states from suit under 
their own laws, it should be inapplicable when the state is sued under laws 
that derive immediately from an entity other than the state.25
Interestingly, but often overlooked, the bar to suing states over the 
constitutional validity of state law (as in Perry) comes not directly from 
state sovereign immunity but indirectly from statutory interpretation 
influenced by immunity.  The vehicle for challenging the constitutionality 
of state laws is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides individuals with an 
equitable action against “every person” who, under color of state law, 
violates federal law, as by attempting to enforce an unconstitutional law.
 
26  
A state is not a person for section 1983 purposes, an interpretation driven 
by sovereign immunity and the absence of a clear statement or legislative 
history showing congressional intent to override sovereign immunity.27
But judicial interpretation of a federal statute remains subject either to 
judicial overturning or congressional override.  Under current state 
sovereign immunity doctrine, Congress may abrogate immunity through 
appropriate enforcement legislation enacted pursuant to its powers under 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
 
28  Section 1983, which authorizes 
private remedial actions against conduct that itself violates section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (including the incorporated Bill of Rights), has 
been recognized as appropriate legislation through which Congress may 
constitutionally subject a state to suit.29
At least as to constitutional claims, the answer to sovereign immunity has 
been to redirect litigation to the executive branch officers responsible for 
enforcing a law alleged to be constitutionally invalid.  The plaintiff names 
the officer as defendant in an action seeking an injunction or other 
prospective relief prohibiting continued or future enforcement of the invalid 
law; that officer will be subject to the judicial command not to violate the 
Constitution going forward and to contempt for violating the order.  The 
Court explicitly recognized this litigation approach as to state officers in Ex 
parte Young,
  Congress thus could enable 
litigation directly against states simply by amending section 1983 to define 
“person” to include states. 
30
 
 25. Alden, 527 U.S. at 797–98 (Souter, J., dissenting); Gey, supra note 
 has affirmed it as an essential limitation on sovereign 
16, at 1658. 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 27. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64–67 (1989); Quern v. Jordan, 
440 U.S. 332, 340–43 (1979). 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (granting Congress power to enforce the other 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 29. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158–59 (2006); see also Howard M. 
Wasserman, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and John Doe Defendants:  A Study in Section 1983 
Procedure, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 837–38 (2003). 
 30. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
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immunity,31 and has implicitly accepted the theory with respect to 
injunctive actions against federal executive officers.32
This doctrinal landscape explains the procedural posture of much of the 
marriage equality litigation.  Perry named as defendants, among other 
executive officers, then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and then-
Attorney General Jerry Brown; Brown then replaced Schwarzengger as 
defendant-Governor and Kamala Harris replaced Brown as defendant-
Attorney General.  Similarly, one DOMA lawsuit challenged the refusal by 
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (an agency of the 
Department of Homeland Security) to grant a petition allowing a male non-
citizen married (in Iowa) to a male U.S. citizen to apply for lawful 
permanent residence status; the suit named Secretary of Homeland Security 
Janet Napolitano, along with Attorney General Eric Holder, who heads 
DOJ, the federal department charged with enforcing federal statutes.
 
33
The individual officer suit workaround is explained (and often derided) 
as a legal fiction, but one accepted as necessary to preserve sovereign 
immunity while also ensuring governmental accountability, constitutional 
compliance, and vindication of individual liberty.
 
34  The core fiction is that 
the individual officer, not the government, is the true party in interest and 
the injunction does not run against the state, at least so long as the 
injunction simply compels adherence to federal law and does not limit state 
control over its treasury.35
In fact, the availability of individual officer suits is not a legal fiction but 
an inherent component of sovereignty and sovereign immunity.  Under 
English common law, while the king could not be sued eo nomine given 
divine right and royal dignity, his ministers and officers were subject to a 
full range of prerogative writs in the courts of law and chancery, including 
injunctions.
  A second fiction is that the injunction runs only 
against the individual officer, even though it also binds that individual’s 
successor-in-office who was never a party to the original action.  Thus, had 
Perry been resolved before Jerry Brown became governor, the injunction 
entered against Schwarzenegger would have continued in force against 
Brown. 
36  Requiring the suit to run against the governor or attorney, 
rather than California or the United States, simply imports this into the 
sovereignty of republican governments.  Moreover, as John Harrison has 
argued, Ex parte Young itself was well grounded in common law and 
English sovereign immunity.37
 
 31. See, e.g., Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart (VOPA), 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1638 
(2011). 
  Young was, at bottom, an anti-injunction 
suit, one of the core actions available in equity:  the potential defendant in a 
 32. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its 
Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 811 n.2 (2010). 
 33. Revelis v. Napolitano, No. 11 C 1991, 2012 WL 28765, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 
2012). 
 34. VOPA, 131 S. Ct. at 1638; Gey, supra note 16, at 1654. 
 35. VOPA, 131 S. Ct. at 1638. 
 36. Jaffe, supra note 14, at 1–2. 
 37. See generally John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2008). 
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threatened action at law (a criminal prosecution for violating state laws 
governing railroad rates) brought an action in equity, asserting as his claim 
what would be a defense in the action at law (the unconstitutionality of the 
state law) and requesting an injunction barring prosecution of the action in 
law (enforcement of the state laws).38
It is tempting to simply accept sovereign immunity because, as John 
Jeffries argues, it “almost never matters.”
  Sovereign immunity is not 
implicated in such a case, because the sovereign is not immune from the 
assertion of a defense in an action at law. 
39  Private plaintiffs can sue state 
or federal officers for injunctions and damages and the federal government 
can sue state governments (in their own names) for violations of federal 
law.40  Sovereign immunity does not relieve the government or its officers 
of the duty to comply with the Federal Constitution and it does not, as a 
general matter, prevent constitutional enforcement; it “simply makes 
enforcement more difficult for private individuals.”41
But this relies on a faulty premise.  It begins as if sovereign immunity, 
softened by the inherent workaround of only mildly inconvenient individual 
officer suits, must be our default.  In other words, sovereign immunity is 
“no big deal” because other enforcement mechanisms remain. 
  As the marriage 
equality cases demonstrate, plaintiffs will have a chance to make their 
constitutional arguments to the federal court and future enforcement of a 
constitutionally infirm law will be halted. 
When we acknowledge the inconsistency between sovereign immunity as 
applied to a legal entity and republican government, however, the default 
changes.  If we are concerned with the “dignity” of a person (i.e., a king) 
whose ultimate authority is deemed divinely conferred, the inconvenience 
or increased complexity of individual litigation perhaps is acceptable in the 
balance.  But ultimate authority in a republican system does not rest with 
the legal entity of the government body, so there is no “dignity” to protect.  
The increased inconvenience and enforcement complexity needlessly 
burdens the process of constitutional litigation without any countervailing 
dignitary benefit. 
It is clear to everyone—including government officials themselves—that 
even a suit for an anti-enforcement injunction is one against the 
government.42
 
 38. Id. at 997–98. 
  Although not subject by name to the injunction, it is the 
government that will be limited in its future enforcement conduct and thus 
in its sovereign authority.  If the governor is enjoined from enforcing the 
state prohibition on same-sex marriage, then the State of California is 
enjoined from enforcing that prohibition.  If the Secretary of Homeland 
 39. John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. 
L. REV. 47, 49 (1998). 
 40. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754–57 (1999). 
 41. Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal Government?  State Sovereign 
Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1551, 1561 
(2003) (reviewing NOONAN, supra note 15). 
 42. Jaffe, supra note 14, at 39. 
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Security is enjoined from enforcing the DOMA-dictated limitation on 
recognizing same-sex marriages in immigration matters, the DHS—and 
thus the United States—is enjoined from making certain decisions about the 
status of married persons.  This demonstrates the largely symbolic nature of 
sovereign immunity (at least in actions not directly seeking monetary 
remedies), which achieves little beyond making constitutional litigation 
more analytically and procedurally complex. 
Moreover, the DOMA cases demonstrate that naming the entity in a 
constitutional action is not an unbearable burden. Consider Windsor v. 
United States, an action by a spouse-executor to recover more than 
$360,000 in taxes that would have been waived if federal law recognized 
her valid New York same-sex marriage.43  The United States was the 
named defendant in that case because the government has formally waived 
sovereign immunity in civil actions seeking refunds of taxes erroneously or 
unlawfully collected, including, as in Windsor, when the tax was collected 
in violation of the Constitution.44
II.  STANDING AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
  It is difficult to see why the same, simple 
captioning procedure should not work in all constitutional injunction cases.  
Federal law should not be concerned with how or how competently the state 
defends itself; the burden is on the state if it fails to designate someone to 
defend it or empowers someone who does a poor job. 
Hall is correct that Article III requires an interested defendant.  The 
named officer-defendants in the marriage equality cases (themselves or 
through the governmental department charged with defending them) have 
declined to defend the constitutionality of the prohibitions or have chosen to 
do so in a way likely to result in the laws being invalidated in court.45
Unlike the named officer-defendants, the individuals and groups seeking 
to enter these cases are not directly affected by any judgment or injunction.  
This is why Hall and the federal courts are forced to speak of this in terms 
of standing and intervention.  An Article III case or controversy does not 
exist if the new defending party is neither responsible for the 
unconstitutional conduct (because they were not enforcing an 
unconstitutional law) nor subject to the ultimate injunction barring 
enforcement (because they are not responsible for future enforcement).  Put 
simply, an affected party is no longer defending the case.
  
Were Governor Brown or Secretary Napolitano truly the real party in 
interest in their respective cases, either could take a confession of judgment 
against them or otherwise proceed in a way that ensures a non-reviewable 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and a court order barring enforcement of 
the laws. 
46
 
 43. 797 F. Supp. 2d 320, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 
 44. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2006). 
 45. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Revelis v. Napolitano, No. 11 
C 1991, 2012 WL 28765, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2012); Windsor, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 322; 
Hall, supra note 9, at 1541. 
 46. Hall, supra note 9, at 1551. 
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In reality, of course, both Napolitano and Brown are nomine stand-ins for 
legal entities that themselves cannot be sued eo nomine only because of 
sovereign immunity; the entities are the real interested defendants.  The 
scramble of individuals and groups trying to get into these cases—
Congress, BLAG, state legislators, county officials, private advocacy 
groups, popular initiative sponsors—are only seeking to substitute as 
nomine stand-ins. 
The standing concerns disappear if we stop demanding stand-ins and let 
actions proceed against the entity in its own name.  A government entity is 
unquestionably an interested defendant in litigation challenging the 
constitutionality of that entity’s laws.  The State of California has an 
interest in the challenge to Prop. 8, and the United States has an interest in 
the challenges to DOMA.  If either entity is named as a defendant, we have 
a dispute between adverse and interested parties who will be restricted by 
the judgment and have their conduct regulated by an injunction.  We 
therefore are ensured a party with standing to defend and to appeal any 
adverse judgment. 
III.  WHO REPRESENTS GOVERNMENT? 
Eliminating sovereign immunity as a part of U.S. law eliminates the 
standing issue that Hall addresses in his article.  The Perry plaintiffs simply 
could have named the State of California (recognized as a person under 
section 1983) as defendant; the DOMA plaintiffs could have named the 
United States, or the Department of Homeland Security, Department of 
Treasury, or any other federal agency that refused, in light of DOMA, to 
recognize a valid same-sex marriage.  The entity defendant has standing to 
defend and to pursue the case throughout the Article III judiciary—they 
would be adversely affected by a judgment and subject to any relief 
obtained, they have an interest in the outcome, and they have an incentive 
to litigate vigorously. 
Of course, a legal entity only acts through its officers.  We thus still must 
consider what happens when the officers charged by law with litigating the 
government’s position decline to defend the laws or adopt a less than 
favorable legal defense.  Even if government is sued in its own name, we 
still face the procedural complication that has arisen in the marriage 
equality cases. 
What has changed is the nature of the problem.  BLAG or the Prop. 8 
sponsors are seeking permission to litigate the government’s interests, not 
their own.  Rather than asking the standing question of who is sufficiently 
interested in the case to be a defendant or appellant, we now ask who gets to 
represent, defend, and make arguments as, and on behalf of, the interested 
named government entity.  That is, in a system of divided authority, who is 
the government? 
Importantly, however, this is not an Article III or constitutional standing 
question.  Because there is a case or controversy between the plaintiffs and 
the named defendant government entity whose law is being challenged, the 
Constitution should not care who speaks for the government in this 
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litigation.  This instead becomes a sub-constitutional question of how a 
particular republican government elects to structure itself (within 
constitutional parameters) and how it elects to divide powers among the 
several branches and between government officers and members of the 
public.  It is a question of how government will defend its laws in court and 
who will litigate on its behalf.  To the extent a government makes bad 
choices in whom it authorizes to defend it or in how its interests will be 
defended, the federal courts do not save litigants from bad representation or 
bad litigation strategy. 
A state should have virtually unlimited power to identify those 
authorized to represent it and to provide a constitutional defense on its 
behalf.  This could include a potentially competing range of executive 
branch officers, legislators, citizens, and citizen groups; the state also could 
establish hierarchy or order of power to represent.  This remains a pure 
question of state law and state legislative discretion (limited perhaps only 
by the Guarantee Clause47); federal courts must defer to state legislative 
choices and, when necessary, use certification to have the state supreme 
court resolve disputed questions as to who represents the state in a given 
case.  The federal court must abide by the state court determination of state 
law.  Unlike standing, there should be no federal constitutional overlay.48
It is telling that this is how the Ninth Circuit and the California Supreme 
Court resolved the certified question in Perry.  The Ninth Circuit asked the 
California Supreme Court to address whether the initiative sponsors had 
particular interests under state law that it could protect in litigation.  In 
answering the certified question, the state court focused instead on the 
sponsors’ authority under the state constitution and state statutory law to 
defend the validity of popularly enacted laws on behalf of California itself.  
The power to effectively become the state was a necessary and inherent 
incident of direct democracy and the power of citizens to create state law 
directly; without it, elected officials could undermine the initiative process 
and render popularly enacted laws nullities by refusing to enforce or 
defend.
  
Federal law should not be concerned with how the state government 
defends itself. 
49  The state court discussed but expressly declined to resolve 
whether the sponsors held any personal or special interests or rights as a 
group, apart from the state’s interests.50  When the case returned to federal 
court, the Ninth Circuit accepted the state court’s conclusion and 
recognized the sponsor’s power to appeal on behalf of the state.51
The federal court’s unqualified acceptance of the state court 
determination suggests that it understood that the sponsors were not really 
 
 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”). 
 48. Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1992) (considering 
Article III standing requirements even when the plaintiff was statutorily authorized to sue). 
 49. Perry VII, 265 P.3d 1002, 1024–25 (Cal. 2011). 
 50. Id. at 1014–15. 
 51. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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litigating on their own behalf (which would necessitate a showing of 
personal stake) but on behalf of the State of California, the real party in 
interest that does have a personal stake.  Because the individuals were not 
truly representing their own interests, there was no need to consider 
whether they satisfied Article III’s standing requirements in their own right. 
At the federal level, Congress has done much the same.  Under federal 
law, DOJ is charged with representing the United States in court and with 
defending all federal laws.52  Federal law also requires the attorney general 
to notify Congress when DOJ has decided not to defend a law.53  
Notification allows Congress to authorize others, such as the Office of 
Senate Legal Counsel or BLAG, to step in to defend and argue the validity 
of the law as the purported representative of the United States.54
Once allowed to defend the government’s interests, that party defends for 
all purposes.  In Windsor, when BLAG sought to intervene as a defendant, 
DOJ argued that BLAG’s intervention should be limited only to arguing in 
support of DOMA’s constitutionality under rational basis review (which 
DOJ no longer would do), while DOJ would retain the authority to lead the 
government defense, particularly on matters of procedure.
 
55  The court 
rejected that argument, however, concluding that BLAG was permitted to 
intervene as a full party defendant, able to make all substantive and 
procedural arguments and decisions it sees fit.56
The struggle is to control who gets to be the United States in this 
litigation, a choice left to Congress (subject, perhaps, only to the President’s 
authority to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”
 
57).  Congress 
must ensure that someone is identified and empowered by law to represent 
the United States, but the fault lies with Congress if it fails to do so 
completely or thoughtfully enough, or if the designated defender fails to 
perform competently.  In fact, DOMA reveals such a failure—Congress 
never granted BLAG statutory authority to litigate federal constitutional 
interests.58
One might object that entity litigation, and the possibility of competing 
actors seeking to litigate on behalf of the entity, makes it more difficult for 
government to speak with a single voice in court.  This objection merits 
several responses. 
  The issue has not been pushed in court, however, so Congress 
has not been disadvantaged by its legislative mistake. 
First, the burden for ensuring one voice rests with the political branches 
to establish clear and specific rules and processes for determining who 
speaks for the government, how, when, and in what order.  Federal courts 
 
 52. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006). 
 53. Id. § 530(d). 
 54. 2 U.S.C. §§ 288a–288n (2006); see also Windsor v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 2d 
320, 323 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 55. Windsor, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 324–25. 
 56. Id. 
 57. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See generally Devins & Prakash, supra note 7. 
 58. Hall, supra note 12, at 1578–79; see Windsor, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 323 n.2 (stating 
that no federal statute authorizes the House or any subpart of the House to intervene to 
defend the constitutionality of a federal statute). 
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must then defer to those statutory rules.  Second, there may, in fact, be a 
benefit to having multiple voices in litigation.  In a system of separated 
powers, power is divided among multiple branches, departments, and actors 
who may disagree on what the “governmental” position should be.  Courts 
benefit from that disagreement and from hearing all competing positions, 
which may help them resolve the case more accurately through the 
adversary process.59  Third, this approach is both democracy and litigation 
reinforcing.  If the executive officer primarily responsible for representing 
the government in its constitutional defense chooses not to do so, she must 
make and announce that choice publicly and she must deal with any popular 
fallout at the ballot box
CONCLUSION 
.  At the state level, where all executive branch 
officers often are independently elected, this may have real teeth.  At the 
same time, the legislature can ensure that the government is always fully 
represented and able to defend its position in court by designating multiple 
actors who can step into the breach in a case of non-defense or under-
defense. 
As a doctrinal matter, eliminating sovereign immunity and switching to 
entity litigation can be achieved fairly easily.  No constitutional amendment 
is necessary, since the Constitution says nothing of the federal government 
having sovereign immunity.60  Immunity derives from the Supreme Court’s 
understanding of “universally received opinion,” an understanding that the 
Court could reject.  Broad state sovereign immunity is similarly a product 
of judicial interpretation rather than constitutional text, which the Court also 
can alter by decision.61  Moreover, states could be made subject to suit on 
constitutional claims simply by recognizing that a state is a person for 
purposes of section 1983, either by the Court overturning two of its prior 
decisions62 or by Congress amending section 1983.63
Rejecting state sovereign immunity still leaves the Eleventh Amendment, 
which textually bars suits against states by citizens of other states in federal 
court.
  These changes also 
render Ex parte Young superfluous; there is no need for that workaround 
doctrine allowing suits against responsible executive officers if the entity 
can be sued directly and by name, bringing the case caption in line with 
reality. 
64
 
 59. Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 919–20 (2012) 
(discussing the benefits of Congress speaking on its own behalf in federal constitutional 
litigation). 
  But once we eliminate ideas of state sovereign immunity, two 
understandings of the Amendment’s language remain, neither a significant 
hurdle to enabling people to sue states for constitutional injunctions.  Under 
 60. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1205. 
 61. Id. at 1205, 1224. 
 62. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64–67 (1989); Quern v. Jordan, 
440 U.S. 332, 340–43 (1979). 
 63. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 64. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
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the “diversity” interpretation, the Eleventh Amendment only prohibits 
diversity actions between a state and citizen of another state, but not federal 
question actions, such as the federal constitutional claims at issue in 
Perry.65  Under the “plain language” approach, the Eleventh Amendment 
bars all claims against a state by a citizen of another state, including those 
based on federal law,66
Without question, the argument presented here has never been the law in 
the United States, although it has much to recommend it as a matter of 
“political theory and plain justice.”
 meaning that a citizen of another state cannot sue a 
state to enjoin an unconstitutional law.  While a small number of 
constitutional claims unfortunately may be barred, the majority of 
constitutional challenges to state laws are brought by citizens of that state. 
67
 
  It is a legal position much to be 
hoped for, not only in light of the already expressed criticisms of sovereign 
immunity, but also in light of the complexity of individual-defendant 
litigation and the confusion that arises when an individual defendant refuses 
to defend.  Entity-centered litigation, without sovereign immunity, is more 
consistent with the American concept of popular sovereignty.  It also is 
procedurally simpler and better able to handle procedural anomalies, such 
as those that have arisen in the marriage equality cases. 
 
 65. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 760 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996)). 
 66. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1205–06; Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words 
of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342, 1368 (1989). 
 67. Young, supra note 41, at 1567. 
